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S

These are the days of miracle and wonder
And don’t cry baby, don’t cry. . . .1

am Harris is frightened. And, as he would tell us, people who are
frightened often do or say things that are not rational (pp. 38–39).
Harris’s attack on “faith” and the Abrahamic religions began on 12
September 2001 in the midst of “collective grief and stupefaction,” and
it shows (p. 323). He describes how he and his fiancée visited France
but “had decided to avoid obvious terrorist targets while traveling.”
“First on our list of such places,” reports Harris, “was the American
embassy in Paris. Paris is home to the largest Muslim population in
the Western world.” The embassy was “the last place we would have
willingly visited while in France” (p. 55). Whatever else might be said
about this bit of self-revelation, it is assuredly not rational. Harris
has the same lifetime risk of being struck by a meteor as being killed
by a terrorist.2 Having lived in Paris, I can assure him that bands of

1. Paul Simon, “The Boy in the Bubble,” Graceland (Warner Bros., 1986).
2. This example is from John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of
the Omnipresent Enemy,” Foreign Affairs 85/5 (September/October 2006): 8, who notes
that the lifetime risk of an American being harmed by terrorism is about 1:80,000. Harris
assumes a far greater risk every time he enters a motor vehicle.
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the Muslims he so distrusts are a far greater risk in the warrens of
Marseilles or in the public housing projects of the Paris banlieue than
are terrorists on Place de la Concorde. Harris is, however, frightened
for himself and his civilization. He is at war with a terrorist enemy—
his consequent assault savors of scorched earth, not precision bombing. This approach might destroy the enemy he fears, but whether
anything worth saving would remain is another matter.
Harris’s account begins, as polemics often do, with dehumanization of the enemy and an emphasis on the magnitude of the threat
about which Something Must Be Done. In Harris’s case, this is
couched in an evocative account of a suicide bomber who straps nails,
ball bearings, and rat poison to himself before detonating a bomb on
a commuter bus. Horrible as this is, Harris saves the worst for last:
“Why is it so easy, then, so trivially easy—you-could-almost-bet-yourlife-on-it easy—to guess the young man’s religion?” (pp. 11–12).
“The Bomb in the Baby Carriage”
Despite Harris’s confidence, this exercise may not be as trivially
obvious as he assumes. At present, in the public mind, suicide bombing is widely associated with Muslim fundamentalism. A rational
approach to this question, however, would seem to demand that we
actually consider the evidence behind our collective gut reaction.
Harvard’s Alberto Abadie analyzed domestic and international
terrorism and concluded that “countries with intermediate levels of
political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly
authoritarian regimes. . . . [Thus] transitions from an authoritarian
regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases
in terrorism.”3 Abadie notes that this explains the past prevalence of
terrorism in Spain and Russia, locations for which Harris’s trivially
3. Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,”
October 2004, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. W10859, p. 3;
available at Social Science Research Network, http://ssrn.com/abstract=611366 (accessed
August 2008). This quotation also appears in an updated version of this paper published
in American Economic Review 96/2 (May 2006): 51.
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easy guess about the religion (or even religiosity) of terrorists is probably wrong. We must ask if being Muslim is simply a matter of historical contingency—those areas with nonresponsive governments, poor
law enforcement, and significant political grievances tend (at present)
to contain Muslims.
Harris might retort that religion still drives such conflicts. Again,
Abadie’s data argue otherwise, since “only the measure of linguistic fractionalization shows a significant association with terrorism.”
When income, degree of political freedom, and linguistic fractionalization are adjusted for, “ethnic and religious fractionalization are not
significantly associated with terrorist risk.”4 Education and a larger
proportion of males aged 15–24 likewise had no impact on rates of
terrorist activity.5
If terrorism is not affected by religious differences, perhaps the specific choice of suicide bombing is? Harris makes much of the “apoca
lyptic” strain in Islam and the other Abrahamic religions, arguing
that this makes them willing—even eager—to turn to suicide bombing because of their beliefs about the afterlife (see pp. 31–33, 38–39,
123–34, 223). But Robert Pape’s widely reported research calls this
tidy assumption into question. In his analysis of 188 suicide attacks
conducted from 1980 to 2001, Pape found that while acts of terrorism
declined from the 1980s (e.g., 666 in 1987) to the twenty-first century (e.g., 348 acts in 2001), suicide terrorism increased markedly.6
Indeed, suicide terrorism was rare before the 1980s—yet surely Islam
held much the same eschatology during the preceding one and a half
millennia. And given that the purported rewards for martyrdom are
the same whether one kills a few or a thousand infidels, Harris cannot
argue that the availability of weapons of mass destruction has suddenly made suicide terrorism attractive to Muslims. Clearly there is
more to the story than he sets out.
4. Abadie, “Roots of Terrorism,” 6, emphasis added.
5. Abadie, “Roots of Terrorism,” 7 n. 10.
6. Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political
Science Review 97/3 (August 2003): 343. Pape’s thesis has been expanded into a fulllength book: Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New
York: Random House, 2005).
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Harris seems to realize that his theory is on shaky ground. Having
assured his readers that one could “almost bet your life” on a suicide
bomber being a Muslim, he then caches a remarkable admission in an
endnote:
Some readers may object that the bomber in question is most
likely to be a member of the Liberations Tigers of Tamil
Eelam—the Sri Lankan separatist organization that has perpetuated more acts of suicidal terrorism than any other group.
Indeed, the “Tamil Tigers” are often offered as a counter
example to any claim that suicidal terrorism is a product of
religion. But to describe the Tamil Tigers as “secular”—as
R. A. Pape . . . and others have—is misleading. (p. 229 n. 2)
This would seem to be an important point—the Tamil Tigers
are responsible for more suicide bombing than anyone else—and yet
Harris inserts this inconvenient fact in a footnote. He likewise objects
to labeling them as “secular,” though, as Pape notes, they are more
than secular: they are Marxist/Leninist with a secular agenda.7 Pape
likewise points out that even a third of Muslim terrorist attacks express
secular aims.8 How does Harris justify his reading? “While the motivations of the Tigers are not explicitly religious, they are Hindus who
undoubtedly believe many improbable things about the nature of life
and death” (p. 229 n. 2).
The Tigers want a Tamil state; this is an avowedly secular goal—
one not merely “not explicitly religious.” Harris gives us no evidence
for the purportedly Hindu quality of the Tigers’ ideology or the “many
improbable things” that he (in a display of “faith”) assures us they
“undoubtedly believe”:
The cult of martyr worship that they have nurtured for decades
has many of the features of religiosity that one would expect
in people who give their lives so easily for a cause. Secular
Westerners often underestimate the degree to which certain
7. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 343.
8. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 343.
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cultures, steeped as they are in otherworldliness, look upon
death with less alarm than seems strictly rational. I was once
traveling in India when the government rescheduled the exams
for students who were preparing to enter the civil service: what
appeared to me to be the least of bureaucratic inconveniences
precipitated a wave of teenage self-immolations in protest.
Hindus, even those whose preoccupations appear to be basically secular, often harbor potent religious beliefs. (p. 229 n. 2,
emphasis in original)
Harris’s argument, then, seems to break down syllogistically as
follows:
A. Some Hindus in India have some crazy beliefs about the
afterlife and are not afraid to kill themselves (not others) over
trivial matters because of them.
B. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka are nominally Hindu.
Conclusion: Therefore, despite their Marxist/Leninist ideology (which awaits no afterlife at all), and despite their
avowedly secular aims, the Tamil Tigers have crazy beliefs
about the afterlife that make them willing (or cause them) to
use suicide terrorism.
At the least, this is not ironclad reasoning. This is the first—but not
last—instance of Harris’s tendency to label anything that he considers
irrational as “religious,” from Islam to Maoism.9 “Religion” becomes
an epithet for whatever Harris feels is “unjustified belief.”
Despite Harris’s hand waving, Pape has not been rebutted. Far from
being acts based on irrationality, “suicide terrorism follows a strategic
logic. . . . The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated
or random acts by individual fanatics,” which might be expected if religious beliefs were the driving force. After all, one group of dead heretics
is surely as good as another if a reward in the afterlife is your motivation.
Instead, suicide attacks form “part of a larger campaign . . . to achieve a
9. Harris describes Stalin and Mao (who “paid lip service to rationality, [but] communism was little more than a political religion . . . both cultic and irrational”) and
Germans’ “abject (and religious) loyalty to Hitler” (pp. 79, 100, emphasis in original).
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specific political goal.”10 Other analyses point out that suicide bombers’
decisions need not be irrational, and “it is possible to explain such acts
in rational choice terms, and that, while such acts are indeed extreme,
they are merely an extreme example of a general class of behavior in
which all of us engage.”11
Furthermore, the goals sought by suicide bombers are decidedly
secular, firmly anchored in the here and now: “Suicide terrorism is
specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self-determination. . . . Every suicide terrorist campaign from 1980 to 2001 has been waged by terrorist groups
whose main goal has been to establish or maintain self-determination
for their community’s homeland by compelling an enemy to withdraw.” Pape notes further that suicide terrorism is on the rise for the
prosaic reason that terrorists have learned that it pays dividends that
are secular, not eschatological.12 Suicide attacks killed thirteen people
on average (not counting the 9/11 attacks), while nonsuicide terrorism killed less than one person per attack.13 Suicide terrorists made
significant gains for their cause in 50 percent of cases, while conventional states’ attempts to coerce others succeed only about a third of
the time.14 This is a strategic logic that needs no scriptural exegesis.
Harris might insist that the suicide bomber’s actions reflect his
own religious beliefs and needs, but Ronald Wintrobe’s analysis argues
that the suicide bomber “intensifies his participation in group activities. . . . He gives up some of his own values and substitutes the values
of the group for them. . . . Such trades imply that a person is more and
more giving up his identity for that of the group . . . and losing the
capacity to make decisions based on values other than those of the
leader.” Thus the leaders’ frankly secular goals become increasingly
10. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 344.
11. Ronald Wintrobe, “Can Suicide Bombers Be Rational?” (5 November 2001;
revised 15 May 2002, 5 January 2003), 2, http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/cpolit/
papers/suicide.pdf (accessed 9 May 2008).
12. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 2, 351–55, emphasis added.
13. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 346.
14. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 351.
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important and may reach a point where “rational suicide for the group
is possible.”15
Wintrobe notes that “religious ‘exchange’ would appear to provide
a simple explanation of the events of 9/11. Religion promises an afterlife, so the individual, to the extent that he is convinced by this, may
not be making a sacrifice at all in martyring himself.”16 This is Harris’s
argument distilled to its essentials. “However,” cautions Wintrobe,
neither the desire for social cohesion nor religiosity are sufficient conditions for terrorist activity. Indeed, many deeply
religious people are obviously among the least likely candidates for this role. . . . What differentiates the [terrorist] from
these others? A high level of social cohesion may make the
individual member of a group ready to sacrifice himself, but
the leader of the group or some other individual with whom
one identifies still has to order the individual to commit terrorist acts. . . .
In short, in these failed [Muslim] states one expects to see
pockets of extreme social cohesion, with charismatic leaders
subject to no central control providing solidarity and social
services, educating their members that their problems are
caused by an external enemy and demanding that they take
radical actions against that enemy to help their fellows.17
It goes without saying that such a dynamic is possible for both theists
and atheists.
“Boy in the Bubble”: Error, Contradiction, and Misapprehension
The Abrahamic religions, for Harris, are particularly insidious
because of the premium they place on “faith.” Faith, in his view, is
nothing but a decision to believe in spite of a lack of evidence, or even
against evidence. “It should go without saying,” huffs Harris, “that
these rival belief systems are all equally uncontaminated by evidence”
15. Wintrobe, “Can Suicide Bombers Be Rational?” 3.
16. Wintrobe, “Can Suicide Bombers Be Rational?” 26.
17. Wintrobe, “Can Suicide Bombers Be Rational?” 36, 38, emphasis in original.
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(p. 15). But Harris does not leave it without saying, and the utter lack
of evidence for any claim made by any Abrahamic religion is a constant refrain, as if repetition could substitute for the presentation of
actual evidence.18 Harris might well claim the evidence is equivocal
or unpersuasive or conflicting. But he overreaches: do believers really
advance no evidence whatever for their beliefs?
Harris may dispute whether the evidence adduced by theists is,
in fact, adequate, but to argue that Christians do not seek and value
such evidence is nonsense. For example, St. Justin Martyr held that
“reason directs those who are truly pious and philosophical to honor
and love only what is true, declining to follow traditional opinions.”19
The Catholic Encyclopedia declares that
the evidence upon which we assent to this Divine truth must
also be itself Divine, and there must be as close a relation
between that truth and the evidence upon which it comes
to us as there is between the coloured object and the light;
the former is a necessary condition for the exercise of our
visual faculty, the latter is the cause of our actual vision. But
no one but God can reveal God; in other words, God is His
own evidence.20
Anglican theologian W. H. Griffith-Thomas insists that faith
“affects the whole of man’s nature. It commences with the conviction
of the mind based on adequate evidence,” includes “the certainty of
evidence,” and is “not blind, but intelligent.”21
18. See, for example, Harris, End of Faith, 16, 19, 23, 25, 48, 62, 65, 66, 67, 72, 76, 221.
19. Justin Martyr, The First Apology II, in The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr
and Irenaeus, vol. 1, Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995), 163. Many more examples from Christian thinkers are conveniently collected online at http://christthetao.homestead.com/articles/
FaithandReason.pdf (accessed 18 March 2008).
20. Hugh T. Pope, “Faith,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton
Co., 1909), 753.
21. W. H. Griffith-Thomas, The Principles of Theology: An Introduction to the Thirtynine Articles (London: Longmans, Green, 1930), xviii–xix; cited in Alister McGrath,
Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007),
86, 171.
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“Every religion,” complains Harris, “preaches the truth of propositions for which no evidence is even conceivable” (p. 23, emphasis in
original). This represents a spectacular failure of the imagination. The
Abrahamic religions are all revealed—that is, they argue for direct
divine communication via theophany or angelic messengers, at least
in principle. Surely it is at least conceivable that an angel could appear
or that God could unequivocally reveal himself.
I wonder if Harris has ever even spoken to an articulate believer.
“Ignorance is the true coinage of this [religious] realm—‘Blessed are
those who have not seen and have believed’ (John 20:29)” (p. 65).
Ironically for Harris, this statement by the risen Christ is preceded by
most of the disciples handling his resurrected body, and it is followed
by the claim that “many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of
his disciples[;] . . . these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus
is the Christ, the Son of God” (John 20:30, 31). The New Testament
author, then, does not advocate belief that is not based on evidence. He
provides, rather, eyewitness testimony of Christ and signs as a basis
for belief. One may choose to discount such evidence, but to claim
that no evidence is offered, or that the type of evidence (eye-witness
testimony) is illegitimate, is arbitrary if not absurd.
Harris’s advocacy of Eastern spiritual disciplines betrays a double
standard. While dismissive of the entire Western religious tradition,
he is deeply enamored of Buddhist meditation, which he believes is
“supported by a wealth of evidence,” can “uncover genuine facts about
the world,” and can be “personally transformative” (p. 40).
Harris insists that “to be ruled by ideas for which you have no evidence (and which therefore cannot be justified in conversation with
other human beings) is generally a sign that something is seriously
wrong with your mind” (p. 72). He is again insisting that Christians,
Jews, and Muslims have no evidence for their beliefs—but by this
standard he cannot justify many of his. After all, he cannot prove to
another human being that he has thoughts or that he acts on thoughts
or beliefs. Our own thoughts and experiences are not public knowledge. Such trite positivism ought to have died out years ago.
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Theistic private experiences, inspirations, intuitions, revelations—
these cannot be “justified” publicly, and so Harris dismisses them.
Yet he insists in the next breath that “intuition” is a valid, even vital
faculty for ethics and that this “is no less true in science” (p. 183).
How can Harris’s intuition about ethics be publicly confirmed? Unless
I share the intuition, we are at an impasse.22 Why are intuitions about
moral behavior and science valuable, even vital, but intuition about
God illegitimate?
Likewise, Harris seems to grant other Buddhist ideas a free pass.
“The place of consciousness in the natural world is very much an open
question,” he assures us, and “the domain of our subjectivity constitutes a proper (and essential) sphere of investigation into the nature of
the universe: as some facts will be discovered only in consciousness, in
first-person terms, or not discovered at all” (pp. 208–9). A theist might
well say the same thing about the existence of God or the expression
of God’s will. Such things are not to be discovered by syllogism or a
randomized controlled trial, but simply in the first-person encounter
with God within one’s inner self. Theists have said such things about
God, repeatedly, so it is no surprise that Harris goes to great lengths
to caricature the Western tradition as consisting solely of those who
either embrace or ignore the idiocies written in their holy books, the
inerrant word of God (pp. 17–18). There are doubtless some who fit
that description, but this does not exhaust the richness and variety of
the Abrahamic tradition.
Eventually Harris insists that “spiritual intuitions,” despite their
internal, subjective nature, can be studied rigorously among practition
ers. One needs only substitute “divine revelations” into his argument:
As in any other field, [divine revelations] are amenable to
inter-subjective consensus, and refutation. Just as mathematicians can enjoy mutually intelligible dialogue on abstract
ideas (though they will not always agree about what is intuitively “obvious”), just as athletes can communicate effectively
about the pleasures of sport, mystics can consensually eluci22. I take up Harris’s treatment of ethics in the following section.
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date the data of their sphere. Thus, genuine [revelation] can
be “objective”—in the only normative sense of this word that
is worth retaining—in that it need not be contaminated by
dogma. As a phenomenon to be studied, spiritual experience
[i.e., revelation] is no more refractory than dreams, emotions,
perceptual illusions, or, indeed, thoughts themselves. (p. 220)
One can only offer a hearty “Amen, brother!” Those who have had
such experiences have no difficulty communicating with others about
them and managing to compare notes, as a visit to any Latter-day
Saint testimony meeting can demonstrate. This is not to say (as with
the mathematicians) that each will agree on every point. As Joseph
Smith always warned, true revelation will properly make us wary
of dogma and creeds, which restrict rather than expand revelatory
possibilities.23
But with respect to the Western tradition, Harris is in the posture of
the innumerate dunce who complains that all the mathematicians’ talk
of calculus and manifold spaces is mere gobbledygook. What serves as
evidence for them—often quite profound and compelling evidence—
moves him not at all. He is like a couch potato who has never known a
runner’s high and so cannot understand why some people would jog to
the store when they have a Hummer in the driveway.
“This Is the Long Distance Call”: Mysticism and Revelation
“Mysticism is a rational enterprise. Religion is not,” insists Harris.
This is a dubious claim, without serious qualification or special pleading, since a key aspect of mysticism is its ineffability.24 Mystical texts will
tell you how to achieve such states, but they can say little about content.
23. “I cannot believe in any of the creeds of the different denominations, because they
all have some things in them I cannot subscribe to, though all of them have some truth.
I want to come up into the presence of God, and learn all things; but the creeds set up
stakes, and say, ‘Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further;’ which I cannot subscribe to.”
Joseph Smith, History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, ed. Brigham H.
Roberts (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1980), 6:57. See also History of the Church, 5:215.
24. See Hugh Nibley, “Prophets and Mystics,” in The World and the Prophets, ed.
John W. Welch, Gary P. Gillum, and Don E. Norton (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and
FARMS, 1987), 102–3.
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“The mystic has reasons for what he believes,” Harris insists, “and these
reasons are empirical” (p. 221). So, as we will see, do many who believe
in divine revelation. While Harris’s attack is focused on all Western theists, he raises issues that are particularly germane to a Latter-day Saint
audience. I will now consider these issues in some detail.
Harris’s attitude represents one pole of an increasingly common
attack from secularists against theism generally and the Church of
Jesus Christ in particular. Harris’s view strikes me as the minority
stance since he believes that real truths of value can be derived from
mysticism. Far more common is the claim, as voiced by one tediously
verbose critic, that
recent scientific studies show that spiritual experience is “real”
in the sense that while a person perceives herself to be having
a spiritual experience the brain does things that are consistent
with what neurologists would expect to produce profoundly
moving mental states (see Andrew Newberg et al., “Why God
Won’t Go Away”).25
For a secularist, scientistic critic, believers’ religious experiences don’t
tell us anything about reality outside of the person experiencing them,
and we can thus dismiss any claim that the Latter-day Saints’ revelatory experience says something about “truth.” “You had an experience,” the critic can condescend, “and the experience was ‘real,’ but it
didn’t mean anything larger since other religions can make the same
sorts of claims.”
Neuroradiologist Andrew Newberg and colleagues have used
functional brain imaging to study a variety of meditating subjects:
[Our] experiment with Tibetan meditators and Franciscan
nuns showed that the events they considered spiritual were,
in fact, associated with observable neurological activity. In a
reductionist sense, this could support the argument that religious experience is only imagined neurologically, that God is
25. Bob McCue, “Notes for Van Hale’s Radio Show,” e-mail posting, 5 September
2004 (copy in author’s possession).
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physically “all in your mind.” But, a full understanding of the
way in which brain and mind assemble and experience reality
suggests a very different view.26
Critics in Harris’s mold, who embrace meditation as a window into
important truths, and the more reductionistic critics who argue that
spiritual experiences mean nothing at all both have little to say about
the phenomenon of revelation in the Church of Jesus Christ. This
broader issue is worthy of consideration.
Phenomenon or Epiphenomenon?
A neuroimaging team might study a patient who reports that he
is “seeing” an apple. The team could demonstrate that certain areas
in the occipital cortex light up in a predictable pattern whenever the
patient reports “seeing” an apple. The skeptics would have us believe
that because this reported sensation can be detected on a PET scan,
there is no such thing as literal vision and no literal apple! This is
counterintuitive at best. Without knowing whether an apple was, in
fact, in front of the patient’s open eyes during the scan, there would
be no way to tell from the radiology data whether the apple existed or
not. For spiritual matters, it is impossible to crack open the scanner
and spot the apple (or its absence).
Put simply, all cognition must cause brain level changes. Everything
we think, feel, experience, or sense must induce a change at the level
of the neurons. Is it any surprise that similar experiences will provoke
similar areas of the brain to behave in similar ways, since we know
that the brain is anatomically specialized for a variety of functions?
Whether such brain changes are all that is happening is, of course, the
intriguing question. Newberg makes this point repeatedly.27
So the key question remains: Are brain changes the “phenomenon”
(i.e., the whole of the experience, a “hallucination” of an apple), or are
they an “epiphenomenon” (i.e., caused by something outside of the brain:
26. Andrew Newberg, Eugene G. D’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why God Won’t Go
Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York: Ballantine, 2001), 36.
27. For example, see Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 36–37.

160 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

light traveling from an apple, striking the retina, and influencing the
neurons)? There’s no way to tell, by this—or any—set of experiments.28
Newberg argues that the changes wrought by spiritual experiences are
every bit as “real” as those from standard sensory phenomena.
Spirits in a Material World?
Functional brain studies might cause problems for religious traditions that believe “spirit” is an ineffable class of existence quite separate from the physical universe. The materialistic changes seen on a
brain scan might suggest that something quite prosaic and physical is
going on, rather than the person is receiving some numinous message
for which only the human spirit is “tuned.” Such an argument, however, completely falls apart in a Latter-day Saint worldview. Indeed,
Latter-day Saints might find it strange if there were not such physical
changes associated with spiritual experiences: “There is no such thing
as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure,
and can only be discerned by purer eyes” (Doctrine and Covenants
131:7). Thus for the Saints there is no radical spirit/matter dichotomy.
Spirit is matter, though less easily detected by mortal eyes. If a spiritual
experience is to have an effect upon a mortal being, it would not be
surprising to find detectable physical changes in the gross “nonspiritual” matter that we can study. We won’t detect the actor, necessarily,
but we might expect to see the effect of the action. Nancey Murphy, of
Fuller Theological Seminary, understands this: “If we recognize the
brain does all the things that we [traditionally] attributed to the soul,
then God must have some way of interacting with human brains.”29
For Latter-day Saints, brain and spirit/soul are the same type of thing
(matter), so this is no surprise at all.
28. “At this point in our research, science had brought us as far as it could, and we
were left with two mutually exclusive possibilities: either spiritual experience is nothing more than a neurological construct created by and contained within the brain, or
the state of absolute union that the mystics describe does in fact exist and the mind has
developed the capacity to perceive it. Science offers no clear way to resolve this question.”
Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 147.
29. Cited in Michael Shermer, How We Believe: The Search for God in an Age of Science
(New York: W. H. Freeman, 1999), 65.
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Are All “Spiritual” Experiences Equivalent?
Secular critics often assume, if only tacitly, that studies on Eastern
mystics and Franciscan nuns are somehow applicable to Latter-day
Saint revelatory experiences. To my knowledge, no studies have been
done on Latter-day Saint members who claim to be receiving revelation. Just because some patients may hallucinate about apples does not
mean that true sightings of true apples (or true oranges!) cannot also
occur.30
Note the description of one meditating test subject:
Whatever Robert calls this deeper consciousness, he claims
that when it emerges during those moments of meditation
when he is most completely absorbed in looking inward, he
suddenly understands that his inner self is not an isolated
entity, but that he is inextricably connected to all of creation.
Yet when he tries to put this intensely personal insight into
words he finds himself falling back on familiar clichés that
have been employed for centuries to express the elusive nature
of spiritual experience. “There’s a sense of timelessness and
infinity,” he might say. “It feels like I am part of everyone and
everything in existence.”31
This description is typical of the mystical traditions found in the
Eastern religions beloved by Harris, and it has some parallels to those
of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Pigeonholing such a widespread
tradition is always risky, but I will chance it. In general, mysticism
seeks a direct, unmediated experience of and union with the world
or the divine through spiritual discipline. The description offered to
30. This is not to claim that Franciscan or Buddhist experiences are mere fictions.
I am simply pointing out that one type of “spiritual hallucination” would not rule out
“true spiritual” experiences any more than visual hallucinations rule out true vision.
“A false ghost,” wrote Chesterton, “disproves the reality of ghosts exactly as much as a
forged banknote disproves the existence of the Bank of England—if anything, it proves
its existence.” Gilbert K. Chesterton, “IX—Authority and the Adventurer,” Orthodoxy
(New York: Dodd, Mead, 1908); available online at http://www.leaderu.com/cyber/
books/orthodoxy/ch9.html (accessed 17 September 2008).
31. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 2.
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Newberg is typical: “It feels like I am part of everyone and everything
in existence.”
Newberg goes to great lengths to describe mystical states, which
can be sought by theists and atheists:32
Mystical experience . . . is nothing more or less than an uplifting sense of genuine spiritual union with something larger
than the self. . . . Mystical states are often characterized by
strong, contradictory emotions. . . . Time and space are perceived as nonexistent, and normal rational thought processes
give way to more intuitive ways of understanding. The mystic frequently experiences intimations of the presence of the
sacred or the holy, and often claims to have seen into the most
essential meaning of things, resulting in a rapturous state that
has been described as “an interior illumination of reality that
results in ultimate freedom.”33
This is, however, far from the Latter-day Saint revelatory tradition in
general and also from my own experience. The Saints view God as
an embodied individual with whom one may communicate directly.
Rather than looking in, one is speaking out. Rather than seeking
union with the Divine or dissolving one’s own duality, one is seeking
two-way communication with It as a (lesser) partner. Such revelation
is always twofold, involving emotional content coupled with rational
information and insight. Terryl Givens has aptly labeled this concept
“dialogic revelation.”34 In one of the earliest Latter-day Saint articulations of the process, the Lord told Oliver Cowdery, “You have supposed that I would give it unto you, when you took no thought save it
was to ask me. But, behold, I say unto you, that you must study it out
in your mind” (D&C 9:7–8).
32. Andrew B. Newberg and Mark Robert Waldman, in Born to Believe: God, Science,
and the Origin of Ordinary and Extraordinary Beliefs (New York: Free Press, 2007), 215–
45, describe experiments on an atheist who meditates on the idea of “God.”
33. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 101.
34. See the discussion in Terryl L. Givens, By the Hand of Mormon: The American
Scripture That Launched a New World Religion (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), 209–39.
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Critics of the Church of Jesus Christ often insist that Latter-day
Saint revelation is exclusively or primarily emotional, something that
might be “felt by simply watching a Hollywood movie,” but this is
a fundamental misrepresentation.35 The united witness of mind and
heart is key in Latter-day Saint doctrine. A Latter-day Saint revelatory experience has as much—or more—intellectual content as it does
emotions of peace or joy: “If you desire a further witness, cast your
mind upon the night that you cried unto me in your heart, that you
might know concerning the truth of these things. Did I not speak
peace to your mind concerning the matter? What greater witness can
you have than from God?” (D&C 6:22–23). Notice that information is
spoken to the “mind” and the peace then follows. And the solution for
later doubts or concerns is not reliance on “a feeling,” but an admonition to recall specific information communicated earlier.
Character of the Mystical Experience
I well remember a university class on medieval Judaism in which
I had my first encounter with mysticism. I was (and still am) struck by
the utter novelty and strangeness of those religious ideas. This isn’t to
say that I doubt the reports of the mystics; I just have no religious point
of reference for identifying with them. Who is the Mormon equivalent
of St. John of the Cross? Where are the Latter-day Saint manuals of
spiritual discipline? What is the Mormon Ein Sof ?
Newberg also indicates that “transcendent” moments with music
may derive from the same neurochemistry.36 As a lifelong audiophile,
I do know something about those experiences, whether engendered
by Bach or the Beatles, and can see the parallels to the Jewish mystics’
concepts. But they are not like revelation. To better appreciate this difference between mysticism and revelation, consider Newberg’s report
35. This characterization comes from an anti-Mormon DVD, Search for the Truth:
Jesus Christ/Joseph Smith, placed anonymously at thousands of homes across the United
States and Canada beginning on 27 March 2007. See http://en.fairmormon.org/Search_
for_the_Truth_DVD (accessed 19 March 2008).
36. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 77–80.
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on the demands of the mystical experience that he and his colleagues
seek to neuroimage:
Virtually all mystical traditions identify some sense of
union with the absolute as the ultimate spiritual goal.
Correspondingly, nearly all those traditions have developed
rigorous systems of training and initiation, designed to help
the devoted reach that rarefied state.37
The authors here verify what Harris claims—that this is not an easy
thing to learn and that it takes time, practice, and special techniques that are targeted at achieving the mystical experience.38 Zen
Buddhists used “koans . . . to loosen the grip of the conscious mind.”
Kabbalists “performed complicated mental manipulations of numbers and images to reach the same end” and “aimed . . . to annihilate
the ego. . . . To this end, they used meditation, controlled breathing,
and other contemplative techniques to silence the mind.” Christian
mystics “relied upon intense contemplative prayer, fasting, silence,
and various forms of mortification to free their minds from mundane
matters” and “believe[d] that God could only be known by a mind
that has been cleansed of all distracting thoughts and images.” Islamic
(Sufi) mystics aim for “ʾfana, or annihilation,” via “a combination of
fasting, sleepless vigils, chanting, and contemplation, all intended to
induce altered states.”39
While such devotion and effort is impressive, I just cannot draw
any parallels here to the Latter-day Saint revelatory experience as I
have lived it or been taught it. Contrast the disciplines of the mystics
with the Latter-day Saint approach, in which prospective converts are
asked to receive the Book of Mormon with faith in Christ and then
“ask God.” For Latter-day Saint revelation, there are no physical ges37. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 103.
38. “Mysticism, to be viable, requires explicit instructions, which need suffer no
more ambiguity or artifice in their exposition than we find in a manual for operating a
lawn mower.” Harris, End of Faith, 217, emphasis in original. “Like any skill that requires
refinements in perception or cognition, the task of recognizing consciousness prior to the
subject/object dichotomy can be facilitated by an expert.” Harris, End of Faith, 218.
39. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 103–5.
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tures aside from kneeling and bowing the head (and even these are not
essential). There are no candles, altered lighting, controlled breathing,
or focus on images of God or the Void. There is no music or special
preparations. Prayers are extemporaneous and unscripted. There is no
“vain repetition,” no iteration of meaningless or rote phrases. There
are no sessions with spiritual trainers.
In fact, fasting is the only common element, and proselytes are
not generally exposed to this Latter-day Saint practice until after their
baptism—most new members report revelation without resorting to a
fast. Furthermore, I suspect that missing two meals a month has little
to do with the prolonged, frequent fasts and mortification to which
the mystics subject themselves.
Even more important to my mind than the vast differences in
technique is the gulf between the mystical and Latter-day Saint revelatory end product. Newberg repeatedly emphasizes that “all [mystical
traditions] are based on a common insight: The first step in attaining
mystical union is to quiet the conscious mind and free the spirit from
the limiting passions and delusions of the ego,”40 with one ultimately
experiencing union with the transcendent. Rabbi Eleazar is quoted to
bring the point home: “If you consider yourself as ‘something,’ and
pray to Him for your needs, God cannot clothe Himself in you. God is
infinite and cannot be held in any kind of vessel that has not dissolved
itself into No-thing.”41
Joseph Smith, of course, got himself in enormous trouble for
claiming revelation that did not conform to the mystical pattern. He
did not, as mysticism scholar Evelyn Underhill said of the mystics,
“persist . . . [in saying] that God in his absolute Reality is unknowable—is dark—to man’s intellect.”42 (Note again that the intellect plays
a key role in Latter-day Saint revelation.)
In contrast to mystical experiences, the revelation enjoined upon
every Latter-day Saint member, and upon which I base my continued
40. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 103.
41. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 104.
42. Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 347–48, quoted in
Givens, By the Hand of Mormon, 76.
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membership in the church, is a conversation. It is a discussion. There
is no effort to dissolve oneself into the Infinite or to become absorbed
in God or Christ. Rather, such revelation is a simple, even matter-offact, act of discourse. There is no sense of space and time being nonexistent. It does not require great preparation. It need not always be initiated on the petitioner’s end. Far from disposing of them, this practice
puts my needs or ego all too uncomfortably front and center, whether
I want them there or not.
To be sure, many members will talk about how they “felt” when
they prayed. It is to fundamentally misunderstand these experiences,
however, if we assume (as critics often do) that this talk of “feeling”
means simply—or only or primarily—“emotion.” We are stymied, in a
sense, because we have no good word for what happens that does not
also have other secular connotations that the critic could also misinterpret if he chose. Hugh Nibley’s description is apt:
[The critic] cannot conceive how anyone could possibly
acquire knowledge by any method other than his. He cannot believe that any man has experienced anything which he
has not experienced. . . . “I have never seen a vision,” says the
[skeptic], “therefore Joseph Smith never had one. I have seen
dreams [or had unitary brain experiences or mystical insight],
therefore I will allow him that.”43
Despite what I will not say about such experiences, I can at least say
this: one of the most significant products of such experiences is their
ability to transform my behavior and character. I am too familiar with
the experience of trying mightily to alter some behavior, thought, or
fault and not succeeding. But if I engage in a few moments of dialogic
revelation, fundamental, deep-rooted parts of my nature that have
resisted my best efforts can be altered for the long term. Is there emotion with this? Of course, but that emotion is partly a reaction to what
has happened; it is not simply the happening itself. If a wealthy benefactor walked up and handed me a million dollars, I would doubtless have a few stirrings of happiness—but I would hardly then pre43. Nibley, “Prophets and Scholars,” in Nibley, The World and the Prophets, 31.
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sume that there never was any money to begin with. When Christ can
remake a lifetime of error in me, I think I am more suited than the
critic to decide if this is merely neurons firing in the dark.
Harris argues that “almost every problem we have can be ascribed
to the fact that human beings are utterly beguiled by their feelings
of separateness” and insists that “a spirituality that undermined such
dualism, through the mere contemplation of consciousness, could not
help but improve our situation” (p. 214). This may be, but the same
separateness and isolation from self and others can also be countered
by the revelatory tradition, which has the advantage of being focused
on an external reality of God’s law and love rather than being an
inward reflection on mere subjectivity. If we wish to heal our relationships with other humans, I would argue that there can be a substantial
and beneficial difference between an interpersonal relationship of love
with the divine and merely “recognizing consciousness prior to the
subject/object dichotomy” (p. 218). The former models what we must
achieve with others; the latter does not. Revelation tells us about facts
outside and superior to ourselves; mysticism can at best only show us
things about ourselves. Both are potentially valuable, but they are not
equivalent. A Latter-day Saint revelatory experience is far removed
from mysticism’s personal dissolution into a Nirvana with little information communicated except an inarticulate connectedness, where
one merely “pay[s] extraordinarily close attention to his moment-bymoment experience of the world” (pp. 234–35).
Critics generally want to persuade us that Latter-day Saints and,
say, devotees of Buddhist meditation
(a) would have similar neuroimaging results, and hence
(b) are experiencing “the same thing,” which
(c) certainly has no relationship to an outer reality.
But such a critic has no data to establish (a). The vast differences in
intent, technique, and reported content for Latter-day Saint experiences suggest caution in assuming (b), while (c) is not the conclusion
of those who conducted the studies, and this either/or decision cannot
be settled by science anyway.
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“Baby with the Baboon Heart”: A Science of Ethics?
I conclude with the most disturbing part of Harris’s analysis. His
appeal to Eastern mysticism constitutes a fairly pedestrian attack
on religion. The recommendations that Harris makes, however, are
troubling.
Of Hebrews 11:1, Harris claims that “read in the right way, this
passage seems to render faith entirely self-justifying: perhaps the very
fact that one believes in something which has not yet come to pass
(‘things hoped for’) or for which one has no evidence (‘things not
seen’) constitutes evidence for its actuality (‘assurance’)” (p. 64). Such
a reading is, as we have seen, the “right way” only because it provides a
caricature of Christian belief that Harris can then brush aside.
Harris himself provides an excellent example of exactly the type
of faith he disparages. “Faith is nothing more than a willingness to
await the evidence,” he sniffs (p. 66). This isn’t the case, but if it is,
Harris certainly manifests plenty of “faith”:
If we better understood the workings of the human brain,
we would undoubtedly discover lawful connections between
our states of consciousness, our modes of conduct, and the
various ways we use our attention. What makes one person
happier than another? Why is love more conducive to happiness than hate? Why do we generally prefer beauty to ugliness
and order to chaos? . . . Is the ego an illusion, and, if so, what
implications does this have for human life? Is there life after
death? These are ultimately questions for a mature science of
the mind. If we ever develop such a science, most of our religious texts will be no more useful to mystics than they now
are to astronomers. (p. 20, emphasis added)
There is no evidence that science will ever be able to address these
issues. But Harris is quite comfortable, even confident, that if he waits
for the evidence to arrive, it will: “Science will not remain mute on
spiritual and ethical questions for long” (p. 43). He even advocates
closer attention to “a body of data attesting to the reality of psychic
phenomena, much of which has been ignored by mainstream science”
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(p. 41). So Harris, while dismissing the entire Abrahamic tradition,
thinks ESP has not been looked at closely enough? Were a theist to
suggest that “mainstream science” is simply ignoring valid data on the
reality of God, he would be laughed out of court.
Harris’s “faith” reaches its apogee when he advocates “a science
of good and evil” (pp. 170–203). He points out that if one discards a
“rule-making God,” then moral statements like “Murder is wrong” do
not “seem . . . anchored to the facts of this world in the way that statements about planets or molecules appear to be” (p. 170). However, he
is confident—even faith-filled—that science can save us: “A rational
approach to ethics becomes possible once we realize that questions of
right and wrong are really questions about the happiness and suffering
of sentient creatures. If we are in a position to affect the happiness or
suffering of others, we have ethical responsibilities toward them” (pp.
170–71). But is this really obvious? I readily grant Harris’s conclusion:
we do have an ethical duty to ameliorate and avoid unnecessary suffering. But my conclusion is based on a theistic worldview. This does
not, contrary to Harris’s assertion, derive simply from God “making rules.” Instead it reflects the very nature of reality. God merely
informs us about the facts of the universe: we will be happier, and we
will maximize our potential as beings in his image, if we work, as he
does, to maximize human happiness.
While I applaud Harris’s conclusion, it certainly does not follow
inevitably from science or anything else. What if I am not made happier by seeking to remove suffering? What if I prefer, rather, to cause
suffering or to remain indifferent to it? There are such people in the
world: and if there is no overarching moral reality—if we really are
just bags of self-aware meat—why should I waste my short span of
existence before oblivion by doing that which makes me unhappy?
Harris’s answer is that we rely on “moral intuition,” “a term that
we simply cannot do without, because it denotes the most basic constituent of our faculty of understanding. While this is true in matters
of ethics, it is no less true in science” (pp. 182–83). And, the theist
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could add, in matters of belief in God.44 But if Stalin, Mao, and Pol
Pot are truly happier exercising tyranny and slaughtering millions,
and their moral intuition tells them this is proper, how can they be
gainsaid?
“We simply do not need religious ideas to motivate us to live ethical lives,” argues Harris (p. 172). And I agree. There are many moral
atheists, some of whom are more moral than many theists. But a moral
atheist is moral in spite of the logical consequences of her epistemology, not because of them. In a Latter-day Saint framework, it is not
surprising that many, even most, atheists would follow a clear moral
compass, for “the Spirit of Christ is given to every man, that he may
know good from evil” (Moroni 7:16, emphasis added).
Harris then goes on to argue that free will (what the Saints know
as moral agency) is an illusion since “either our wills are determined
by prior causes, and we are not responsible for them, or they are the
product of chance, and we are not responsible for them” (p. 263). If
this is so, then what moral authority can ethics have at all? If my will
is beyond my control, why castigate me for violations of a moral code,
however derived? Harris is, needless to say, guilty of a false dichotomy.
Joseph Smith provides a third option: being eternally self-existent, we
have no prior cause and are also not due to chance.45 It is strange that
Harris indicts terrorists and religious believers for immoral behavior
that he claims is not freely chosen. If we intuit anything about our
choices, it is that they seem free, and we really do have the sense that
what we decide truly matters. In so vital a matter for ethics, surely our
intuitions ought to carry significant weight.
The most disturbing thing about Harris’s “faith,” however, is not
his naïve scientific triumphalism—his scientism. Rather, this moral
44. For an argument along these lines for the rationality of belief in God, see Alvin
Plantinga, “Rationality and Religious Belief,” in The Experience of Philosophy, ed. Daniel
Kolak and Raymond Martin (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993), 275–90.
45. “We say that God was self—existant [sic] who told you so? It’s correct enough but
how did it get into your heads—who told you that man did not exist upon the same principle.” Joseph Smith, as reported by William Clayton, 7 April 1844; quoted in Andrew F.
Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith: The Contemporary Accounts
of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Provo, UT: Religious Studies Center,
Brigham Young University, 1980), 359.
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muddle is disquieting because of where Harris’s fear of terrorism and
religious believers leads him: “I hope to show that the very ideal of religious tolerance—born of the notion that every human being should be
free to believe whatever he wants about God—is one of the principal
forces driving us toward the abyss” (p. 15).
It is not, then, amoral actions that ought to be opposed—it is religious beliefs themselves. The very idea that every person has a right
to his or her own opinions about God is too dangerous for Harris.
One suspects he has not thought carefully about what might happen
to people like him—indeed what has happened—if a theistic majority reached a similar conclusion about his beliefs or thoughts. Harris
has already detailed the Inquisition in exquisite detail, but such things
apparently don’t bother him if he is on the side of Torquemada in
defense of Civilization and Reason (pp. 80–87). His crusading zeal
is not reserved for violent fanatics, for they are only a symptom of a
greater problem:
The greatest problem confronting civilization is not merely
religious extremism: rather, it is the larger set of cultural and
intellectual accommodations we have made to faith itself.
Religious moderates are, in large part, responsible for the religious conflict in our world, because their beliefs provide the
context in which scriptural literalism and religious violence
can never be adequately opposed. (p. 45, emphasis added)
Thus those who justify violence and terror with faith are not the real
problem, but those who do not justify violence and terror. Harris’s intuition may make this self-evident, but the logic escapes me. “Religious
moderation still represents a failure to criticize the unreasonable (and
dangerous) certainty of others” (p. 39). So religious moderates by definition never criticize fundamentalists? Nonsense.
“Dying in the Corner of the Sky”
Harris is frightened, and certain of his own rectitude. This leads
him to exactly where he claims it leads religious extremists: “Some
propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people
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for believing them” (pp. 52–53). Once again, for Harris it is not the
action that counts; it is the very fact of holding a belief or opinion.
Some beliefs or opinions are worthy of death because of what people
might do. There are “terrible consequences that have arisen, logically
and inevitably, out of Christian faith” (p. 106, emphasis added). For
Harris contingency plays no role, and there is no poor exercise of free
will—which doesn’t exist anyway. Christianity and its doctrines lead
inexorably—inevitably—to historical tragedy. One wonders if he has
read Marx.
It follows, then, that the rational observer (read Harris) can intuit
the ultimate and inevitable consequences of religious belief. What sort
of response is warranted? Harris argues that torture is morally permissible, even required, so he is not afraid to get his hands dirty (pp.
192–99). In a particularly chilling passage, he compares believers to a
plague worthy of quarantine or eradication:
Given the link between belief and action, it is clear that we can
no more tolerate a diversity of religious beliefs than a diversity
of beliefs about epidemiology and basic hygiene. . . . Do we
“tolerate” these [false] beliefs [about disease spread]? Not if
they put our own health in jeopardy. . . . It is not difficult to
imagine a culture whose beliefs relative to epidemiology [the
control of disease] could systematically impose unacceptable risks on the rest of us. There is little doubt that we would
ultimately quarantine, invade, or otherwise subjugate such a
society. (pp. 46, 233)
Once again, Harris wants to launch a preemptive strike on beliefs.
This rhetoric is uncomfortably close to the “Jewish bacillus” that
infected the German body politic.46 And the dragnet will be wide.
“We have a problem with Christianity and Judaism as well [as Islam].
It is time we recognized that all reasonable men and women have a
common enemy. It is an enemy so near to us, and so deceptive, that
we keep its counsel even as it threatens to destroy the very possibility
46. David John Cawdell Irving v. Penguin Books Limited, http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.
cgi/people/i/irving.david/libel.suit/transcripts/day004.15 (accessed 17 September 2008).
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of human happiness. Our enemy is nothing other than faith itself”
(p. 131, emphasis added). His own words provide a rebuke to his species of fundamentalism:
As a man believes, so he will act. Believe that you are the member of a chosen people [the scientifically and morally enlightened], awash in the salacious exports of an evil [religiously
tolerant] culture that is turning your children away from God
[reason], believe that you will be rewarded with an eternity of
unimaginable delights [believe this is the only hope for preservation of your civilization] by dealing death to these infidels
[religious fanatics and their religiously moderate enablers]—
and flying a plane into a building [torture or extermination
of people of faith, regardless of whether they have done anything] is scarcely more than a matter of being asked to do it. It
follows, then, that certain beliefs are intrinsically dangerous.
(p. 44, emphasis in original)
Would Harris act on his theories? I hope not. But, by his logic, he
will. Or someone else will.
The frightening thing is not that Harris can drape such concepts with
the banner of reason or that he is oblivious to the self-contradiction in his
stance. That is nothing new. The frightening thing is that so many have
praised his book and that so few evangelizing atheists have decried the
totalitarian stream that runs through it.
Embracing Christianity or Western theism is not yet a thoughtcrime. But if Harris has his way, it apparently will be. All for the
greater good—Deus vult!

